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The Open Scholarly Commons 
 
I have defined the goal of the Open Scholarly Commons this way: 
 
What we, as the academic library community, want to create is an open scholarly 
commons that will be digital and distributed with colleges, universities, cultural 
heritage organizations, scholarly societies, foundations, and governments 
hosting the content created, funded, or of interest to them in repositories that 
would make the content openly available to the world.  This community would 
fund and support the common infrastructure needed for discovery, access, and 
preservation.  Collectively we would take responsibility for curating and 
preserving the world’s scientific, scholarly, and cultural heritage thus making it 
discoverable and freely available to everyone in the world now and in the future.  
This is the vision.  We need to replace the dysfunctional system we have now 
with one that works.1 
 
Stating the vision is easy.  The hard part is making it happen.  The transition from paper to 
digital and network technologies provided an opening and the technologies necessary for the 
reworking of the scholarly communications system.  While there has been progress, it has been 
spotty at best.  We are not where we should be and there is a danger that the scholarly 
communications system will be captured by commercial interest and used for private gain 
rather than as a public good. 
 
 
The Collective Action Problem 
 
One of the reasons this is so is that in attempting to create the open scholarly commons 
academic libraries, and the academy as a whole, face a collective action problem.  One that we 
have not clearly focused on and have not overcome.  John Wenzler examines this problem 
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using the work of economist Mancur Olson and presents an important assessment of the 
situation academic libraries face.  As he puts it: 
 
Economists and political scientists long have argued that it is extremely difficult 
to replace the unconscious coordination made possible by market transactions 
with the conscious coordination required for collective action. Even when 
everyone involved understands and desires the benefits of cooperation, it is 
often impossible for them to work together to achieve it… Because everyone 
benefits from the creation of public good regardless of whether or not they help 
to produce it, individuals are tempted to become “free riders” who exploit the 
efforts of others. Even those who have no intention of free-riding for themselves 
are reluctant to invest in a public good because they worry that their effort will 
be wasted if too many other people chose to ride for free. In small communities, 
it often is possible to build bonds of reciprocal trust that allow groups to achieve 
collective ends, but it is more challenging for larger and more distributed groups 
to do so.2 
 
Wenzler argues that it is this collective action problem that has made it impossible for the 
academic library community to benefit from digital technologies that should make scholarly 
communication cheaper and more easily available to all of the people who wish to use it.  
Because we have not overcome the collective action problem, we face continued steep price 
increases from for-profit publishers who maintain monopolistic control over much of the 
scholarly communications system and extract monopoly rents for its use.  Wenzler is frank 
about our prospects: 
 
Although it is likely that university libraries could develop a more efficient system 
of scholarly communication if they were to redeploy their collective subscription 
budgets, each individual library— when it decides how to spend its own little 
piece of that huge pie—has little incentive to redirect its own expenditures… 
Unfortunately, if every librarian waits for every other librarian to make the 
investments necessary to develop a sustainable system of Gold OA publishing, it 
may never happen.3 
 
Wenzler’s critique clearly defines the problem we face.  To the extent that academic libraries 
act in isolation, they will inevitably act in their own narrow interest and we will not be able to 
create the infrastructure that will be required to support the open scholarly commons. 
 
Elinor Ostrom and Creating Common Pool Resources 
 
Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics for her work on commons governance.  Her 
book, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, examines 
situations and institutions where commons are successful.  Her work demonstrates that the 
collective action problem though real, can be overcome given the right circumstances, 
incentives, and motivations.  This work can provide both hope and guidance. 
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Ostrom looks at a variety of common pool resources (CPRs) and develops design principles form 
this study.  Her work was with physical systems such as forests, fisheries, or irrigation systems.  
These systems require mechanisms both provisioning (the work require to create and maintain 
the systems) and appropriation (managing how the resource is used). 
 
The commons we are endeavoring to create is digital and networked, as such in is, as Andrew 
McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson put it “free, perfect, and instant.”  Once something is digitized, it’s 
essentially free to make an additional copy of it. 
Once a digital original is created, copies are every bit as good as their digital originals.  In fact, 
the digital copy is exactly identical to the original digital version. 
Networks allow distribution of the free perfect copy from one place to another, or from one 
place to many, virtually immediately.4  This means that the open scholarly commons does not 
need to be concerned with appropriation.  Use does not diminish the resource.  Once 
provisioning is accomplished, that is once the resource is created and there is a mechanism for 
ongoing maintenance and enhancement, the commons can function.  So, provisioning the open 
scholarly commons is what we have to accomplish.  This simplifies the task, but it is still 
significant. 
 
Ostrom states the challenge:  
 
Designing and adopting new institutions to solve CPR problems are difficult 
tasks, no matter how homogeneous the group, how well informed the members 
are about the conditions of their CPR, and how deeply ingrained are generalized 
norms of reciprocity.  Given the strong temptation to shirk, free-ride, and 
generally act opportunistically that usually are present when individuals face CPR 
problems, overcoming such problems can never be assured.  No strong external 
pressures drive individuals toward positive solutions to such problems.5 
 
Ostrom suggests that success in creating a CPR is best when the follow conditions exist: 
1. Parties share a common judgement that they will be harmed if they do not adopt 
an alternative arrangement 
2. Parties will be affected in similar ways by the proposed arrangement 
3. Parties highly value the activities from the CPR, they have low discount rates 
4. Parties face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement costs 
5. Parties share norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social 
capital 
6. The group is relatively small and stable6 
 
She also states, “To solve appropriation and provision problems… individuals must learn about 
the structure of the physical system on which they jointly rely, about their own appropriation 
and use patters, about the norms of behavior that are followed in a community, about the 
incentives they will encourage or discourage as they change rules, and about how all of these 
factors will cumulatively affect their net benefits and costs over time.”7 
 4 
 
When we look at the current state of academic libraries and scholarly communication in light of 
Ostrom’s work it is clear that there is much work that needs to be done.  Let’s take each of 
Ostrom’s six conditions in turn. 
 
1. Parties share a common judgement that they will be harmed if they do not adopt an 
alternative arrangement.  This is a big plus.  There is and has been for a long time an 
understanding that the current structure of scholarly communications is broken and 
that libraries and their parent institutions are being harmed as a result.  We understand 
the system’s problems and the harm that is being done.  We know we should act. 
 
2. Parties will be affected in similar ways by the proposed arrangement.  This is a 
big minus.  At the present time, there is no shared understanding of what the 
system we are trying to create should be.  There is no roadmap.  There is 
probably general agreement at the level of my statement at the beginning of this 
paper.  But agreement on strategies and tactics to construct the system are not 
widely understood or accepted.  Nor do we know what resources individual 
libraries are now committing to activities that support the creation of the open 
scholarly commons.  Because we don’t know what others in our community are 
doing there are no norms to guide behavior.  Creating a general understanding 
on levels of contribution and developing norms is the aim of the 2.5% 
Commitment initiative, but this work is in its infancy.8  Given the diversity of the 
U.S. system of higher education, the U.S. academic library community as a whole 
will probably not be affected in similar ways by the creation of the open 
scholarly commons.  Everyone will have access to the resource and scholars, 
teachers, and students everywhere will benefit, but research institutions will 
have different incentives from liberal arts colleges and community colleges will 
have different incentives from either.  Different organizations will see value in 
contributing to different parts of the commons.  Whether these contributions 
add up to something substantial is an open question. 
 
3. Parties highly value the activities from the CPR, they have low discount rates.  
This is a plus.  It is likely that the academic library community will share in highly 
valuing the resources once it is created.  Having a low discount rate means that 
the future value of the resource declines slowly.  Libraries by their nature have 
long time horizons and so our discount rates are general low in all things.   
 
4. Parties face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement costs.  
It is hard to know what the information costs will be, but it is likely that they will 
be relatively low as there are many existing structures to expedite them.  The 
academic library community does though have a tendency to be overly 
deliberative, which increases costs.  Transformation costs will be higher, but the 
application of digital technologies, if done effectively, means that they should 
not be unduly high.  They are certainly affordable within existing budgets if 
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libraries are prepared to reallocate them.  Enforcement to the extent that it 
exists will be largely through norms and cost should be modest.   
 
5. Parties share norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social 
capital.  Probably a plus.  In general, academic libraries share norms of 
reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital.  Although trust is 
highest in small groups and in most cases the level of investment is small so the 
risks of trust are small.  
 
6. The group is relatively small and stable.  This is a minus.  Academic libraries as a 
whole are a very large and diverse group. The track record for academic libraries 
creating large scale institutional solutions to shared problems is limited.  There 
are many state and regional collaborations, but on a national scale over the past 
75 years, OCLC, and to a lesser extent, the Center for Research Libraries and the 
HathiTrust are the only examples.  
 
When we look at the conditions Ostrom sets for the successful creation of a CPR, it is 
hard to be overly optimistic.  It may be that the scale of the threat and the need 
response will motivate the library community, but it will need to overcome its diversity 
and lack of common vision that this creates if it is to be successful. 
 
In my view, an important first step will be to create the means to make the 
contributions of individual libraries transparent so that contribution norms can be 
developed both nationally as the 2.5% Commitment proposes, or in smaller groups of 
peer institutions such as ARL, the Great Western Library Alliance, or the Oberlin Group. 
 
I do not share Wenzler’s pessimism, but the work of creating the open scholarly 
commons will be clearly be a challenge. 
 
 
Elinor Ostrom and Design Principles for Common Pool Resources 
 
Ostrom examines a variety of successful CPRs and provides the following eight design principles 
for CPRs. 
1. Clearly defined (clear definition of the contents of the common pool resource and 
effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties) 
2. The appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to local 
conditions 
3. Collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate in 
the decision-making process 
4. Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators 
5. A scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules 
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6. Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are cheap and easy to access 
7. Self-determination of the community recognized by higher-level authorities 
8. In the case of larger common-pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers 
of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base level.9 
 
Not all of Ostrom’s design principles apply because, as noted above, appropriation is not 
a problem for the open scholarly commons.  They do though help us in the task we face. 
 
In my view, Ostrom’s work suggests the following as the academic community moves to 
create the open scholarly commons: 
 
1. The successful commons Ostrom evaluated are closed systems with clearly 
define and enforceable boundaries.  The scholarly communication system is 
open and is governed by norms, incentives, and traditions.  The governance of 
the open scholarly commons will be similarly constructed.  The challenge will be 
to modify the traditions and adjust the norms and incentives to change 
behaviors.  The institutions required for the open scholarly commons will create 
tools, services, and standards.  Enforcement mechanisms will not generally be 
available as they are for the CRP institutions Ostrom studied.  
 
2. Ostrom’s work would suggest that the library community, as a whole, needs to 
recognize that we face a grave threat.  That is the monopolization of scholarship 
and its use for private gain.  If asked, most of us would say that this is the case, 
but we don’t often act as if it is so.  We spend large portions of our budgets in 
ways that support the for-profit companies that clearly put profit above the 
public good. 
 
3. It is also important for academic libraries to engage the institutions they serve so 
that the commitment is not simply at the library level.  The commitment to the 
open scholarly commons needs to be at the college or university level.  
Presidents, provosts, and the faculty need to understand what is at stake and 
support the path forward.  Without this level of institutional support, it will be 
unlikely that the level of commitment for resources and sometimes difficult 
policy decisions that will required to create the open scholarly commons can be 
generated.   
 
4. It is also important to understand that with the treat come opportunity.  The 
technology provides tools that make the cost of entry relatively inexpensive.  
Disruptive innovation by small players is possible.  The large commercial players 
have vulnerabilities that can be exploited. 
 
5. Ostrom’s work would also suggest that the academic community needs to be in 
general agreement about how to meet the threat we face.  A generally accepted 
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“road map” is required.  The details need not be filled in, but the general 
strategy needs to be broadly understood and agreed on.  It is likely necessary for 
a strategy to be for coordination and to develop a sense of common purpose. 
 
6. The strategy needs to create infrastructure that can serve a wide variety of the 
projects.  It will be critical to avoid unnecessary specialization of infrastructure 
that wastes resources.  This will require coordination at the national or 
international level. 
 
7. Different groups will make different contributions to different things.  We need 
to accept that every member of the community can participate even when 
contributions differ in type or scale.  Elitism or closed groups will not be 
productive.   Everyone needs to be invited to the table.  What this does not 
mean is that there should be one large super group of libraries at the national or 
even international level.  Ostrom’s work suggests that smaller local groups with 
umbrella groups above them sometimes with several layers is the most effective 
strategy.  This tiered structure would have smaller groups of peer institutions, 
either type of institution or regional groups at the base.  These groups are likely 
to have different priorities and different capacities.  A national umbrella group 
that is inclusive and accepting of this diversity that coordinates this work and an 
international group above that would create a structure that could coordinate 
national efforts.  This seems the best path forward in thinking about how the 
open scholarly commons will be governed.  Although, given the diversity and size 
of the commons governed may be too strong a word. 
 
8. We will need to develop a provisioning strategy that is made up of these nested 
pieces with different communities contributing to the provisioning of different 
resources.  The communities at the base level will need to be small and be made 
up of institutions that are similar, that have a history of working together and 
therefore trust each other.  In many cases, they will have the experience of 
shared investment, usually because of collaborative purchasing.  They will need 
to take on projects that meet most pressing needs they face.  For example, a 
group of community colleges might commit to creating a series of open 
textbooks for large enrolling courses that they all teach.  A group of libraries 
focus on a particular discipline, for example theological libraries, might focus on 
resources for that discipline.  The fact that smaller groups of peer organizations 
are working together will creating make norms around contribution easier. 
 
9. The broad community needs to make contributions with the understanding that 
there will inevitably be institutions that cannot or will not contribute.  These free 
riders will need to be accepted by those who do contribute.  In the future, the 
scholarly reputation of institutions will be based, at least in part, by the scholarly 
infrastructure that they support.  University presses often make the claim that 
their work enhances the brand of the university.  This will continue to be true 
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going forward.  At the very least, the faculty at these institutions will have 
somewhat better access to the infrastructure because of the support their 
institutions provide.  These prestige incentives contribute to the effort.  
 
10. One issue that generates contention in discussions of the open scholarly 
commons is what role if any should for-profit entities play.10  I would suggest 
that for-profit entities can participate, but only if they are prepared to abide by 
the principles the govern the commons.  The dysfunction of the current scholarly 
communications system is not the result of the participation of for-profit 
entities, rather it is that some of the for-profit participants have taken over large 
segments of the sector and have been extracting monopoly rents for a long time.  
Tim Wu argues that consolidation and monopoly or oligarchy is an inevitable 
part of the cycle of information industries evolution.11  To the extent we believe 
Wu’s analysis to be true, we need to build governing principles that mitigate 
against this possibility.  Hindawi’s CEO, Paul Peters suggests, what seem to me to 
be a good beginning for such principles.12  He argues for open source, open data, 
open integrations, and open contracts as the basis for acceptable for-profit 
behavior in open science.  We can extend these principles to the open scholarly 
commons.  Commons and profit are not necessarily incompatible.  Individual 
fisherman are operating to make a profit, but they can still be part of the 
common fishery.  What matters is that they observe the governing principles of 
the commons.   
 
 
Final Thought  
 
I have come to think that fixing the scholarly communications system and creating the open 
scholarly commons is like addressing climate change.  It is a collective action problem of a 
similar scale.  It will require changing behavior and adopting new practices that replace 
comfortable ways of doing the work of the academy.  But as we all lead busy lives and our part 
in the grand scheme of things is small, the energy required to change is hard to muster.  This 
makes getting the attention of administrators and the faculty difficult.  Academic librarians, 
especially those who lead libraries, can though make a difference.  We can advocate and 
reallocate resources, but unless we solve the collective action problem, unless we create and 
learn how to govern the open scholarly commons these individual efforts will not be sufficient.  
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